

STATINTL

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Peking and Moscow Si, Havana No

By Jack Anderson

President Nixon has rejected suggestions that he follow up his trips to Peking and Moscow with an overture to Havana.

He has no intention of seeking better relations with Fidel Castro as long as Cuba exports revolution to other Latin-American countries and Russia is permitted to use Cuban territory for military purposes.

There have been conflicting signals from Havana, whether Castro is really interested in improving relations with the United States. Secret messages have been received in Washington suggesting he is eager to restore normal relations. These have been followed, almost invariably, by public attacks upon the United States.

Last fall, for example, Castro got word that the United States might soften its attitude toward Cuba. He hastily, if cautiously, flashed back the signal that he not only was receptive but that he might even be willing to use "traditional democratic procedures" to spread "socialist power" in Latin America.

Castro's message was repeated in the right places at the United Nations by his diplomatic-intelligence representative, Teofilo Acosta Rodriguez. The word quickly reached the Central Intelligence Agency, which sent a secret report, dated Dec. 8, to the White House.

Secret Message

"In the latter part of November, 1971," reported the CIA, "Teofilo Acosta Rodriguez . . . said that Fidel Castro, Cuban prime minister, had received a report before his departure for Chile that U.S. officials were considering a reversal of the U.S. hard-line policy toward Cuba.

"As a result, Havana had requested Cubans at the United Nations to check the report. Meanwhile, Castro had decided to mellow his tone on the United States during his Chilean trip.

"Acosta commented that there is some support in Cuba for the view that Cuba could benefit from improved cultural ties with the U.S., or some realistic adjustment of differences . . .

"Later in the conversation, Acosta said that Cuban leaders are doing some re-thinking on basic revolutionary tactics. There is some theoretical opposition to the 'Che Guevara' theory, which favors supporting native insurrectionists and anarchists in poor countries.

"Instead, support is growing for the Chilean formula, which maintains that traditional democratic procedures are the best means of socialist power in weak, backward countries."

As it happened, Castro got his signals crossed. He was wrong about the possibility that the United States might soften its line toward Havana. The blunt truth is that President Nixon isn't the least interested in an accommodation with Castro.

Those who watch Havana for the U.S. are convinced that Castro would jump at a genuine chance to normalize Cuban-American relations. He would like nothing better, they say, than to sit down as an equal with Mr. Nixon.

Castro's slashing attacks upon the U.S., they believe, are strictly defensive. He tries to appear intractable toward the United States, they say, because he is convinced the United States is intractable to-

ward him. He is particularly harsh upon Mr. Nixon, whose name is spelled in the party newspaper with a swastika in place of the "x."

These experts also believe Mr. Nixon has been influenced by his Cuban friends, such as Bebe Rebozo, to maintain a hard line toward Castro. The anti-Castro Cubans, who now live and vote in this country, are almost solidly behind Nixon.

Nixon's Cuban Policy

A White House aide assured us, however, that Mr. Nixon doesn't listen to Rebozo on Cuban policy. The aide said the President based his hard line on three factors:

1. U.S. policy toward Cuba isn't unilateral, but multilateral. The Organization of American States voted in 1962 to break diplomatic and commercial ties with Cuba. Until this is reversed, the U.S. will be bound by the OAS vote.

2. Russia uses Cuba as a base to refuel its submarines and for other military purposes. The argument has been made that this violates the Monroe Doctrine. Moscow also gives Cuba an estimated \$250 million a year in military aid, not to mention twice that amount in economic aid.

3. Cuba continues to provide arms, money and guerrilla

training to revolutionary movements throughout Latin America. There is evidence that Russia supports Cuba in spreading subversion.

In another secret report to the White House, for example, the CIA quoted a confidential source as revealing "that the Soviets asked Fidel Castro to try to regain control of Latin American revolutionary movements and to develop closer relations with Latin American communist parties and their leaders . . ."

The source quoted a Cuban intelligence officer, Enrique Benavides, as saying "that Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin had promised to provide financial aid to Castro's efforts to regain control over these movements . . ."

"Benavides said that through Cuba the Soviets will support armed revolution or political struggle, whichever was deemed appropriate, in given countries throughout Latin America. According to Benavides, the Soviets have told Cuba they will 'pay for everything' in helping all revolutionary groups, even Catholic radical groups.

"Benavides strongly emphasized that Cuba has not changed its line but still favors armed revolution everywhere in Latin America."

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Cuban Missiles and Kennedy Macho: New Evidence to Dispel the Myth

by Graham Allison

The story of the Cuban missile crisis, as told both by fans and critics, is a tale of machismo. President John F. Kennedy stood "eyeball-to-eyeball" with Chairman Khrushchev, faced him down, and forced the Soviet Union to withdraw its offensive missiles from Cuba. Instant histories written in the wake of President Ken-

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neddy's assassination praised the Administration's bold moves in the missile crisis, particularly JFK's guts in refusing to compromise American interests, and his courage in sticking to the original demand that all Soviet missiles be removed without a quid pro quo. More recently, revisionists have criticized Kennedy's recklessness and irresponsibility in insisting that Khrushchev capitulate and cry uncle during a confrontation that JFK himself judged to have a one-in-three chance of nuclear war.

In evaluating JFK's performance in the missile crisis, both those who give him high marks and those who say he failed have accepted the official version of the event as fact. In particular, no one (with the exception of Curtis LeMay) has questioned the theme of JFK's toughness under fire. But during the past decade a great deal of evidence has come to light that casts serious doubt on this interpretation. Specifically, it now seems clear that

on Saturday, October 27, the next to last day of the crisis: 1) Soviet surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) shot down an American U-2 reconnaissance plane over Cuba, and Kennedy refused to retaliate; 2) Kennedy ordered U. S. missiles in Turkey defuzed; and 3) JFK sent his brother, Robert Kennedy, to Soviet ambassador D. L. DeLoach

to arrange a private "deal." To appreciate the significance of these facts, and their implications for the dispute about machismo and JFK's performance in the crisis, it is necessary to reexamine carefully one slice of this fascinating story.

The issue in question is that of JFK's actions in resolving the crisis. Recall the background. In the fall of 1962, after Khrushchev has given Kennedy repeated assurances that the Soviet Union will not install offensive weapons in Cuba, an American U-2 photographs the Soviet Union sneaking missiles into Cuba. Kennedy assembles the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExCom) to consider how he should respond. On October 22, Kennedy announces a U. S. naval quarantine of Soviet weapons shipments to Cuba and demands that the Soviets withdraw all strategic offensive missiles from the island. The next day, Soviet ships steaming toward Cuba stop dead on the water, just outside the blockade. But work at the Cuban missile sites proceeds at an accelerated pace. By Friday, October 26, it seems clear that the blockade will not solve the problem: it prevents the Soviets from importing additional missiles but it cannot stop the rush to ready 42 missiles already on the island. The ExCom turns to the question of the next U. S. step. Most members see no alternative to an air strike. The decision will probably be made on Saturday or Sunday and carried out the following Tuesday.

But at the last minute, disaster is avoided. Sunday morning, October 28, Khrushchev announces that the Soviet Union will withdraw the mis-

Our Quid, Their Quo

The question is: How did Kennedy make Khrushchev capitulate? The essence of the official answer is that he stated his demand clearly, refused to budge even an inch, and thus left Khrushchev with the last clear choice between withdrawal on the one hand and a path that could lead to nuclear war on the other.

The main points in this official interpretation include the following. On Friday, October 26, a secret letter from Khrushchev arrived, proposing a resolution of the crisis on the following terms: Soviet missiles would be withdrawn and, in return, the U. S. would promise not to invade Cuba. On Saturday, this Soviet offer was reversed by a second, much tougher letter demanding U. S. withdrawal of American missiles in Turkey as the price for Soviet withdrawal of missiles in Cuba.

To most members of the ExCom, a deal of this sort was simply out of the question. Could the U. S. withdraw NATO missiles from Turkey under Soviet threat? Absolutely not. Dean Acheson, a member of the ExCom, found the idea outrageous. Having just returned from Paris and Bonn, where he had briefed General Charles de Gaulle and Chancellor Conrad Adenauer about the crisis, Acheson assured the ExCom group that such a trade would undermine the faith of the whole alliance in America's word. Soviet specialist Llewelyn Thompson warned that, "the Russians would certainly interpret acceptance as proof of weakness." According to presidential assistant Theodore Sorenson's record of the deliberations, "The President had no intention of destroying the alliance by backing down." As JFK had argued the previous week in rejecting UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson's suggestion of a similar trade-off, he could not make "concessions that could break up the alliance by confirming European suspicions that we would sacrifice their security to protect our interests in an area of no concern to them." Harold Macmillan (Prime Minister of Britain at the time) has recalled his support for the President's "most difficult decision... the refusal, against the advice of weaker brethren in America and the security of

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